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ARBITRATION’S SUMMER SOLDIERS MARCHING  
INTO FALL: ANOTHER LOOK AT EISENBERG,  
MILLER, AND SHERWIN’S EMPIRICAL STUDY  
OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN CONSUMER  
AND NONCONSUMER CONTRACTS 
 
Nancy S. Kim∗ & Chii-Dean Lin† ‡ 
ABSTRACT 
 Our empirical study examines the role and importance of arbitration 
clauses in standard form contracts, primarily with other businesses. While 
much has been written about the impact of mandatory arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts, relatively little has been written on mandatory 
arbitration clauses in customer agreements where the customer was a 
business and not an individual consumer. In this Article, we specifically 
address the findings presented in Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, and 
Emily Sherwin’s study, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study 
of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts.1 Our 
study finds that many businesses employ mandatory arbitration clauses in 
their customer contracts with other businesses. Our study also suggests that 
the primary reason for mandatory arbitration clauses in customer contracts 
where the customer is a business is the avoidance of expenses associated 
with litigation. Our study may help companies to better understand attitudes 
about arbitration and assist in contract negotiations. The results of our study 
may also help courts determine whether arbitration clauses in merchant 
form agreements––and changes to those clauses––are “material” under 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The Contracts Section of the Association of American Law Schools 
hosted a panel at the 2008 Annual Meeting addressing the topic of 
mandatory arbitration clauses.2 The panel specifically focused on the use of 
empirical evidence to determine whether arbitration was better or worse 
than litigation for individual claimants.3 The presentation papers were 
eventually published in a symposium issue of the University of Michigan 
Journal of Law and Reform.4 In this Article, we specifically address the 
findings presented in one of these symposium articles. Theodore Eisenberg, 
Geoffrey Miller, and Emily Sherwin in their paper, Arbitration’s Summer 
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and 
Nonconsumer Contracts, compare the use of arbitration clauses in 26 
consumer contracts and 164 nonconsumer contracts.5 The authors conclude 
that the data suggests arbitration clauses in consumer contracts may be an 
effort to preclude aggregate consumer action.6 
 At the time that Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin were conducting their 
study, we were conducting our own survey of company attitudes toward 
mandatory arbitration clauses in standard business contracts. Our study 
sought to determine the importance of arbitration clauses to companies and 
whether companies would be willing to negotiate such clauses. Given that 
most businesses do not negotiate standard agreements with consumers, we 
created a survey to test attitudes about the role and importance of arbitration 
clauses in standard form contracts primarily with other businesses. While 
much has been written about the impact of mandatory arbitration clauses in 
consumer contracts,7 relatively little has been written on mandatory 
arbitration clauses in customer agreements where the customer was a  
 
 
 2.  Association of American Law Schools, 2008 Annual Meeting: Reassessing Our Roles as 
Scholars and Educators in Light of Change Friday Program, http://www.aals.org/am2008/friday/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2010).   
 3. Id.   
 4. See Omri Ben-Shahar, How Bad Are Mandatory Arbitration Terms?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 777 (2008); Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical 
Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813 (2008); Eisenberg et al, supra note 1; Theodore St. Antoine, 
Mandatory Arbitration: Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783 (2008); W. Mark 
Weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of 
Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 843 (2008). 
 5. Eisenberg et al., supra note 1, at 881. 
 6. Id. at 985; see also discussion infra Part I. 
 7. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in 
Crafting Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing how empirical 
studies of consumer contracts can inform policies regarding arbitration disclosure regulations). 
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business and not an individual. The results of our survey are particularly 
interesting in light of Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s findings.  
 This Article proceeds in five parts. In Part I, we discuss the results of 
Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s paper. In Part II, we explain our 
methodology. In Part III, we summarize our survey results. In Part IV, we 
compare our findings to the findings in Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s 
article. We conclude that our data in conjunction with Eisenberg, Miller, 
and Sherwin’s study indicate that companies are more likely to include 
mandatory arbitration clauses to resolve disputes arising out of ordinary 
business transactions rather than material transactions. Companies are also 
more likely to include mandatory arbitration clauses in customer contracts 
where the customer is a consumer. Their inclusion in business customer 
contracts, however, suggest that companies use mandatory arbitration 
clauses for a variety of reasons, not solely to avoid aggregate dispute 
resolution. Our study may assist courts in determining whether the use of a 
particular arbitration clause in a company’s standard form contract is a 
“material” alteration under section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
I. SUMMARY OF EISENBERG, MILLER, AND SHERWIN’S FINDINGS 
A. Data Description 
 Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin sought to determine whether firms 
were consistent in their use of arbitration clauses across consumer and non-
consumer contracts.8 They identified 21 large companies “in the 
telecommunications, credit, and financial services industries.”9 Most of 
these companies were in Fortune magazine’s list of top 100 American 
companies.10 They collected the standard consumer agreements for these 
companies through means such as the company website or by ordering a 
product.11 The authors also reviewed negotiated agreements of these same 
companies, which were filed with the companies’ Form 8-K and Form 10-K 
“during the period from January 1, 2006 to August 13, 2007.”12 These 
contracts, referred to as “material contracts” because they “materially affect 
the financial condition of the company[,]” included stock purchase 
agreements, credit and security agreements, employment agreements, loan 
pooling and service agreements, and agreements relating to benefits for key 
 
 8. Eisenberg et. al., supra note 1, at 876. 
 9. Id. at 880, 881. 
 10. Id. at 880. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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employees.13 The authors then “coded both consumer agreements and 
negotiated contracts for the presence of mandatory arbitration clauses . . . 
.”14 They also coded for other relevant provisions, such as jury trial 
waivers;15 however, for the purposes of our study, we focus exclusively on 
their findings with respect to the arbitration clauses. 
B. Empirical Results and Analysis 
 The authors found that 76.9% of the consumer agreements included 
mandatory arbitration clauses compared to 6.1% of the nonconsumer, 
material contracts that were not employment contracts.16 Including 
employment contracts, less than 10% of the nonconsumer material contracts 
contained mandatory arbitration clauses.17 Thus, they concluded that their 
data established that large companies “overwhelmingly selected arbitration 
as the method for resolving consumer disputes and permitted litigation as 
the method for resolving business disputes.”18 They stated: 
 
The low rate of mandatory arbitration clauses in material 
nonlabor contracts suggests that the companies in our data set did 
not, in fact, view the purported advantages of arbitration as 
compelling when it came to resolving important business-to-
business disputes. This result suggests reasons for doubting the 
arguments of some arbitration advocates, which would imply that 
rational actors would always prefer arbitration over litigation.19 
 
They briefly entertain other, more pro-arbitration, explanations, such as 
bargaining dynamics.20 For example, parties may not demand mandatory 
arbitration in order to avoid signaling that they are “inclined to breach the 
contract”21 or because they might anticipate that they may be able to agree 
to arbitrate disputes when the occasion later arises.22 They ultimately reject 
these alternative explanations and conclude that “the simplest explanation is 
the most plausible: the parties’ revealed preference indicates that 
 
 13. Id. at 881. 
 14. Id. at 882. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 883. They found that over 90% of employment agreements included arbitration 
clauses. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 887. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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arbitration, for them, is often seen as less desirable than litigation as a 
means for resolving disputes.”23  
 The authors also discuss the contrast between the high rates of 
mandatory arbitration terms in consumer contracts with the low rates of 
such terms in material nonemployment contracts and conclude that the 
“most plausible explanation here is that companies wish to avoid aggregate 
dispute resolution.”24 Here also, the authors discuss and dismiss alternative 
explanations for the differences in arbitration rates between consumer and 
material non-labor contracts.25 The first alternative explanation is that 
because there is no bargaining over contract terms in consumer contracts, 
there is no negative signaling of inclination to breach and thus, no reason to 
“omit an arbitration clause.”26 The authors find this explanation 
“implausible.”27 A second possible explanation that the authors consider is 
that companies favor the litigation system for material contracts that “may 
generate major litigation[,]” whereas they are willing to trade access to the 
most costly and reliable litigation system for smaller consumer contracts 
where there is less at risk.28 In response, they state: 
 
[I]t is not obvious why the tradeoff should favor arbitration for 
small-scale disputes and litigation for large-scale ones (small 
claims court may be just as inexpensive as arbitration, for 
example). More importantly, the hypothesis has a somewhat 
fictional quality because few consumers will in fact exercise their 
rights under arbitration clauses.29 
 
 The authors conclude that “concern over class actions remains the most 
likely explanation for the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer 
agreements.”30 Furthermore, they believe that “the companies in our sample 
do not view consumer arbitration as offering a superior combination of cost 
savings, expeditious decision-making, consistency, and justice. Rather, they  




 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 888. 
 25. Id. at 890. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 894. 
 31. Id. at 894–95.  
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 The authors also state that “corporations’ selective use of arbitration 
clauses against consumers, but not against each other, suggests that their 
use of mandatory arbitration clauses may be based more on strategic 
advantage than on a belief that corporations are better serving their 
customers.”32  
 
II. Our Methodology and Data Description 
A. The Sample 
 The International Association for Contract and Commercial 
Management (IACCM) is a non-profit foundation that works with 
corporations, and public and academic institutions to establish “best 
practices” in contracting standards.33 The membership of the IACCM is 
comprised of individuals at various management levels from 1,600 
corporations and public sector organizations in over 90 countries.34 IACCM 
members may elect to become part of a “Community of Interest.” These 
“Communities of Interest are worldwide networks of professionals who 
share particular areas of expertise.”35 In June 2007, IACCM sent out, on our 
behalf, a survey to members in the following Communities of Interest: 
Contract Clauses, Model Agreements, Contract Standards, Dispute 
Management, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Global & 
International Agreements, and Sales Policy.36 Ninety-seven members 
responded to the survey.37 
 The respondent companies were based all over the world, with two-
thirds of them headquartered in the United States, as set forth in Table 1: 
 
Where is your company headquartered? 
 
United States    67% 
Canada     3% 
Latin America    1% 
Europe     19% 
 
 32. Id. at 895. 
 33. See IACCM Background, http://www.iaccm.com/background.php (last visited Feb. 9, 
2010). For more information about the IACCM, see IACCM Home Page, http://www.iaccm.com (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2010). 
 34. IACCM Background, supra note 33. 
 35. IACCM Community of Interest, http://www.iaccm.com/communities.php (last visited Mar. 
26, 2010). 
 36. Id.  
 37. All survey questions and respondents’ answers to survey questions are on file with the 
authors and the Vermont Law Review. 
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Asia      4% 
Africa     0% 
Other      6% 
 
 The customers of respondent companies were also based all over the 
world, with the majority based in the United States, as set forth in Table 2: 
 
Where are most of your customers based? 
 
United States    60% 
Canada     3% 
Latin America    0% 
Europe     17% 
Africa     0% 
Asia      4% 
Other      16% 
 
 Respondent companies sold to both businesses and consumers, as set 
forth in Table 3: 
 
Does your company sell products and/or services to: 
 
Businesses    56% 
Consumers    3% 
Both       41% 
 
 The amount of an average purchase made by a customer varied, as set 
forth in Table 4: 
 
What is the amount of an average purchase made by a customer? 
 
$0 to $99     1% 
$100 to $999    6% 
$1,000 to $9,999   10% 
$10,000 to $99,999  15% 
$100,000 to $999,999  31% 
$1,000,000 or more  37% 
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What industry is your company in? 
 
Software / Technology   27% 
Services / Outsourcing   16% 
Oil / Gas / Utilities   10% 
Aerospace     7% 
Financial Services   6% 
Manufacturing     9% 
Electronics     4% 
Transport     1% 
Other      19% 
 
 The majority of respondents represented companies with gross annual 
revenues above $500 million, as set forth in Table 6: 
 
What are your company’s average gross annual revenues? 
 
Less than $50 Million   9% 
$50M to $499M    11% 
$500M to $999M   11% 
$1B to $9B     26% 
$10B to $49B     24% 
$50B to $99B     9% 
More than $100 Billion   12% 
 
  The individual respondents held a variety of positions at their 
companies, as set forth in Table 7: 
 
What is your role/title at your company? 
 
CXO38     2% 
Vice-President    3% 
General Counsel/ 
   Associate General Counsel 14% 
Director     12% 
Manager     40% 
Professional    28% 
  
 In addition, 35% of respondents were licensed attorneys.  
  
 
 38. C-level executives are chief executive officers, chief financial officers, or chief operating 
officers. 
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 Finally, 94% of respondents used standard form customer agreements 
and 45% of those form agreements contained mandatory arbitration 
clauses.39 Of those respondents whose standard form agreements contained 
mandatory arbitration clauses, 38% had headquarters in the United States 
and 59% had headquarters in countries other than the United States. Thirty-
nine percent of the respondents using mandatory arbitration clauses had 
customers based in the United States, compared to 57% with customer 
bases outside the United States.40  
III. OUR SURVEY FINDINGS 
 The objective of our survey was to determine the importance of 
mandatory arbitration clauses to businesses. A potential weakness in our 
study is that our survey required respondents to self-report. The data we 
receive is thus subject to flaws in perception or knowledge and bias. We 
tried to minimize self-reporting problems by submitting our survey only to 
members of a reputable international organization that have legitimate, 
large corporations as members. The survey was sent out by IACCM and 
was identified as a joint study with the academic institution of one of the 
authors.41 We explained the purpose of the survey in general terms as 
“conducting research on the impact of mandatory arbitration clauses on 
businesses” to avoid guiding responses. The estimated time for survey 
completion was a short three minutes to encourage participation. Finally, 
we promised anonymity.  
 We discuss (1) the substance and type of respondents’ mandatory 
arbitration clauses; (2) the nature and extent of negotiated changes to 
mandatory arbitration clauses; and (3) attitudes toward mandatory 
arbitration. We also compare our survey findings with those set forth in the 





 39. To be more precise, 43 out of 96 respondents or 44.79% of the total respondents to the 
question stated that their form agreements contained mandatory arbitration clauses; one of the 
respondents declined to answer the question.  
 40. For all of our calculations, we used the software SAS to create the statistical frequency 
table. 
 41. E-mail from Nancy S. Kim, Associate Professor, California Western School of Law and 
Visiting Associate Professor, Rady School of Management, UCSD, to Michael Stanley, Production 
Coordinator, Vermont Law Review, at Attachment 1 (Jan. 28, 2010, 8:30:00 EST)  (on file with authors 
and Vermont Law Review) [hereinafter Attachment 1]. 
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A. Substance and type of respondents’ mandatory arbitration clauses 
 Those survey respondents at companies with mandatory arbitration 
clauses were asked whether their arbitration clause looked substantially 
similar to the following clause: 
 
  The parties agree that any controversy or claim between the 
parties which arises under this Agreement, shall be settled by 
arbitration in accordance with the rules for commercial 
arbitration of the American Arbitration Association (or a similar 
organization) in effect at the time such arbitration is initiated. A 
list of arbitrators shall be presented to the Claimant and 
Respondent from which one will be chosen using the applicable 
rules. The hearing shall be conducted in the [LOCATION], 
unless both parties agree otherwise. The decision of the arbitrator 
shall be final and binding upon all parties. 
  The prevailing party shall be awarded all of the filing fees 
and related administrative costs. Administrative and other costs 
of enforcing an arbitration award, shall be added to, and shall 
constitute part of, the amount due pursuant to this Agreement.42  
 
Fifty-two percent of survey respondents answered affirmatively compared 
to 48% of survey respondents who responded negatively. 
 Survey respondents were also asked to identify the arbitration 
organization mentioned in their company’s mandatory arbitration clause, 
and they responded as follows in Table 8: 
 
What arbitration organization is mentioned in your company’s 
mandatory arbitration clause (check all that apply): 
 
American Arbitration Association (AAA)         22% 
National Arbitration Forum (NAF)           0% 
Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS)        5% 
International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA)   4% 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR)        5% 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)        13% 
Association for International Arbitration (AIA)                 2% 
No organization is specified          7% 




 42. Id.  
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 The vast majority of survey respondents stated that their company used 
a paper contract, which required a signature, as set forth in Table 9: 
 
What type of standard form agreement does your company use?43 
 
Paper based contract with signature required         90% 
Paper based contract with no signature required        6% 
Electronic agreement with click acceptance required        10% 
Electronic agreement with no click acceptance required     6% 
B. Nature and Extent of Negotiated Changes to  
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses 
 The survey asked respondents whether they permitted any changes to 
their mandatory arbitration clauses. Only 5% of respondents “never” 
permitted changes and only 6% “always” permitted changes. Of the 
respondents who had mandatory arbitration clauses, the majority of 
respondents permitted some type of change with varying degrees of 
frequency, as set forth in Table 10: 
 
Does your company allow changes to the mandatory arbitration 
clause? 
 
Always       6% 
Often        15% 
Sometimes      44% 
Rarely       31% 
Never       5% 
  
 The type of negotiated changes ranged from major changes, such as 
removal of the mandatory arbitration clause altogether (28%), to minor 
changes, such as grammatical or typographical changes (24%). “Mandatory” 
arbitration clauses were not actually “mandatory” for 43% of respondents 
who permitted major changes, such as deleting the clause or changing 







 43. Some companies use more than one form, which is why totals exceed 100%. 
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If your company negotiates changes to the mandatory arbitration 
clause, what type of changes are allowed? (check all that apply) 
 
Deletion of the clause    28% 
Changing arbitration from mandatory to optional 15% 
Procedural or geographical changes   47% 
Grammatical or typographical changes  24% 
Allocation of the costs of arbitration  16% 
Other (please specify)    10% 
  
 Eighty-five percent of respondents negotiated changes with their 
business customers only; however, 15% negotiated changes with both 
business and consumer customers. See Table 12: 
 
If your company negotiates changes to the mandatory 
arbitration clause, is it with: 
 
Businesses only     85% 
Consumers only     0% 
Both Business and Consumers   15% 
C. Company Attitudes toward Mandatory Arbitration 
 Fifty-six percent of respondents stated that the primary reason that 
their companies used mandatory arbitration clauses was to reduce 
litigation costs. See Table 13: 
 
What is the primary reason for your company’s mandatory 
arbitration clause?44 
 
Customer preference    6% 
To reduce litigation costs    56% 
Internal Law Department requirement  8% 
Don’t know      0% 
Other (please explain)    10% 
   
 The percentage is actually larger because many of the respondents who 
marked “other” explained that reduction of litigation costs was only one of 
 
 44. The actual question in the survey was: “If you answered “yes” (to the preceding question 
regarding whether the respondent’s company’s form agreement contained a mandatory arbitration 
clause), what is the primary reason for the arbitration clause?” For purpose of brevity and clarity, we 
have rephrased the question for this Article. 
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several proffered reasons. In other words, they marked “other” to indicate 
reasons in addition to reduction of litigation costs. For example, one 
respondent stated as follows: 
 
We have mandatory arbitration clauses in our online consumer 
contracts to try to reduce litigation costs. We also have 
mandatory arbitration in our international contracts. This is 
primarily because we feel more comfortable in arbitration than in 
a foreign court, but also because of the greater certainty of 
enforcement of an arbitration award versus an award by a court. 
 
 Another respondent stated:  
 
To both reduce litigation costs and also minimize the possibility 
of detrimental publicity that court cases may cause. 
 
 A third respondent also marked “other” in order to include other 
reasons in addition to reduction of litigation costs: 
 
In addition to reduce litigation costs, it’s also to expedite the 
process through ADR. 
  
 There were other reasons cited by respondents. For example, several 
respondents cited the avoidance of jury trials: 
 
To provide for a more sophisticated trier of fact than a jury (and 
therefore, in theory, less uncertainty)- would use jury trial waiver 
instead if enforceable in CA. 
  
Confidentiality; avoiding jury trials in US; more business-
oriented resolution of the dispute; ability to appoint one of the 
arbitrators. 
 
Avoid jury trials. 
 
 Other cited reasons included industry custom, confidentiality, and the 
difficulty of enforcing judgments in foreign countries.  
 Of all the 97 respondents queried, 73% said that they, on behalf of their 
companies, had signed another company’s agreement containing a 
mandatory arbitration clause, whereas 27% had not. The 27% figure does 
not, however, mean that the respondents’ companies had not signed another  
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company’s arbitration agreement, but only that the individual respondent 
had not signed the agreement on their company’s behalf. 
 For 33% of companies, the primary reason to permit changes to the 
mandatory arbitration clause was customer insistence. Fifty-eight percent 
did not view requested changes as “deal-breakers.” Interestingly, only 3% 
accommodated requested changes because they believed that their 
competitors permitted such changes. See Table 14: 
 
What is the primary reason your company permits changes to the 
mandatory arbitration clause? 
 
Customer insistence    33% 
It is not viewed internally as a deal-breaking change 58% 
We believe competitors routinely allow changes 3% 
Other (please specify)    5% 
 
 Finally, 45% of respondents believed that mandatory arbitration 
clauses were “very important” or “important.” See Table 15: 
 
In general, how important do you think the mandatory 
arbitration clause is to your company? 
 
Very important     11% 
Important      34% 
Somewhat Important   28% 
Not very important   16% 
Not at all important   11% 
D. Arbitration Clauses and Product Pricing 
 Inclusion of mandatory arbitration provisions in company agreements 
generally did not affect the commercial terms of the transaction. Seventy-
eight percent of respondents stated that the inclusion of a mandatory 
arbitration clause does not affect their company’s standard product pricing. 
See Table 16.  
 
Does the inclusion of the mandatory arbitration clause affect your 
company’s product pricing? 
 
Yes        8% 
No        78% 
Don’t know      14% 
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 Where the company permitted a change to the mandatory arbitration 
clause, 51% said that accommodating such a request never affected pricing 
to that customer, and 39% said it rarely affected pricing to the requesting 
customer. See Table 17: 
 
If your company permits changes to the mandatory arbitration 
clause at a customer’s request, does it affect the price charged to 
that customer? 
 
Always       0% 
Often        0% 
Sometimes      10% 
Rarely       39% 
Never       51% 
E. The Materiality of Arbitration Clauses Under Section 2-207 
 Under Uniform Commercial Code section 2-207, which addresses the 
“battle of the forms” scenario, a term in the offeree’s form which 
“materially alters” a term in the offeror’s form does not become part of the 
contract between the contracting parties.45 Is a mandatory arbitration clause 
such a material alteration? The courts appear split.  
 For example, in Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Industries, 
Inc., the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that an arbitration 
provision in an invoice included with a product shipment was not binding. 
46 In that case, the parties entered into valid, complete oral contracts for the 
sale of yarn, by telephone.47 The defendant made multiple shipments of 
yarn with invoices, which contained mandatory arbitration provisions.48 
The court noted that “the plaintiff did not sign and return to the defendant 
any copy of such document, nor did it any time otherwise manifest to the 
defendant its consent to the arbitration provision, unless its failure to object 
thereto constitutes such a manifestation of assent.”49 The court held that the 
arbitration provision was “[b]eyond question”50 a material alteration as it  
 
 
 45. U.C.C. § 2-207 (2000). Section 2-207 of the UCC was amended in 2003 but the 
amendment has not been adopted by many states as of the date of this publication. 
 46. Frances Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 204 S.E.2d 834, 842 (N.C. 1974). Cf. 
Marlene Indus. Corp. v. Carnac Textiles, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 239, 242 (N.Y. 1978) (finding that an 
arbitration clause is material and may only become part of a contract if the parties expressly assent). 
 47. Frances Hosiery Mills, 204 S.E.2d at 841. 
 48. Id. at 836. 
 49. Id. at 842. 
 50. Id. 
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would force the plaintiff to present its claim to an arbitration board in New 
York rather than to a North Carolina court.51  
 Other cases, however, suggest a willingness to enforce such provisions 
in similar situations.52 In Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expressly rejected 
the district court’s finding that “‘[a]s a matter of law, an arbitration provision 
materially alters ones’ [sic] legal rights under a contract.’”53 The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the inclusion of an arbitration provision 
in a contract did not constitute a material alteration under UCC section 2-207, 
even though it was not expressly accepted by the plaintiff, because it did not 
result in surprise or hardship to the plaintiff.54 In reaching its conclusion, the 
court stated that “[u]nder New York law, an arbitration agreement does not 
result in surprise or hardship where arbitration is the custom and practice 
within the relevant industry.”55 The court further found that in the steel 
business arbitration clauses are commonplace and the norm.56 
 Our survey findings suggest that the inclusion or deletion of mandatory 
arbitration clauses may be material to companies even though such clauses 
are generally not viewed as “deal-breakers.” In other words, the addition or 
deletion of mandatory arbitration clauses may be important or somewhat 
important even if it is not so critically important as to prevent contract 
formation. On the other hand, certain modifications to arbitration clauses, 
such as changing the arbitration organization, may be minor and included as 
part of the parties’ agreement. 
IV. COMPARING THE RESULTS OF THE TWO STUDIES 
A. Summarizing Significant Differences Between the Two Studies 
 Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin make several conclusions in their 
study. In this Part, we examine their conclusions and discuss how our study 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. See N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722, 729 (8th Cir. 1976) (upholding 
arbitration agreement in confirmation notice); Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 
92, 98 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that arbitration provisions in seller’s confirmation orders became part of 
contract between the parties). The courts’ opinions accord with comment 4 of section 2-207 of the UCC, 
which states that “[e]xamples of typical clauses which would normally materially alter the contract and 
so result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express awareness by the other party . . . .” 
U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 4 (2000).  
 53. Aceros Prefabricados, S.A., 282 F.3d at 99–100 (quoting Aceros Prefabricados, S.A. v. 
TradeArbed, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 9387, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3445, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2001)). 
 54. Id. at 100–01. 
 55. Id. at 101.  
 56. Id. at 102.  
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complements and extends or limits their findings. There are several 
significant differences between Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s study and 
our own that make such comparisons between the studies particularly 
interesting. Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s study examined companies in 
the “telecommunications, credit, and financial services industries.”57 Our 
study examined companies in a broader range of industries. Our findings, 
therefore, may extend the applicability of Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s 
findings to other industries or may limit them to their studied industries.58 
Interestingly, in our survey 67% of respondents in the financial services 
sector responded that their form agreements contained mandatory 
arbitration clauses. This finding suggests that companies in the financial 
services sector may be more prone to include mandatory arbitration clauses in 
their contracts than companies in other sectors, thus limiting Eisenberg, 
Miller, and Sherwin’s findings of pro-mandatory arbitration clauses to the 
industries they studied. Unfortunately, we hesitate to make such a conclusion 
as only 6% of our respondents came from the financial services sector.59 
 Furthermore, their study examined only consumer customer contracts 
and compared those contracts with material, nonlabor contracts.60 Our 
study, on the other hand, examined only customer contracts, the vast 
majority of which were with other businesses. Our study, therefore, may 
help explain whether the disparity between consumer contracts and 
material-nonemployee-contracts, established in Eisenberg, Miller, and 
Sherwin’s study, is due to the difference between material and customer 
contracts or the result of bargaining unevenness between businesses and 
consumers. In other words, comparing the results of our two studies may 
help identify whether it is the type of contract (customer or material) or the 
status of the parties (individual consumer or large business) that determines 
the prevalence of mandatory arbitration clauses. 
 Finally, our study specifically asked respondents their views about 
arbitration, whereas Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s extrapolated companies’ 
 
 57. Eisenberg et al., supra note 1, at 880. 
 58. Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin indicate that their study should have broader implication 
for policy beyond the studied industries:  
 Corporations regularly defend their use of mandatory consumer arbitration 
clauses by asserting arbitration’s superior fairness and efficiency over traditional 
litigation. However, corporations’ selective use of arbitration clauses against 
consumers, but not against each other, suggests that their use of mandatory 
arbitration clauses may be based more on strategic advantage than on a belief that 
corporations are better serving their customers.  
Id. at 895. 
 59. See pp. 603–04, at tbl. 5. 
 60. Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin do not expressly define consumer.  
614 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 34:597 
 
                                                                                                                
views from their data.61 Our findings regarding companies’ self-reported views 
about mandatory arbitration clauses may be helpful in relation to Eisenberg, 
Miller, and Sherwin’s conclusions regarding company views. 
B. Prevalence of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Customer Contracts 
 In Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s study, 76.9% of consumer 
contracts contained mandatory arbitration clauses, whereas 23.1% of such 
contracts did not.62 They also found that only 6.1% of nonconsumer, 
nonemployee material contracts contained mandatory arbitration clauses, 
whereas 93.9% did not.63 Because their study compared customer contracts 
with non-customer, material contracts, this differential could be attributable 
to the type of transaction rather than to an inconsistent attitude regarding 
arbitration.64 
 By comparison, our study found that of the 94% of respondent 
companies that used standard form agreements, 45% of those agreements 
contained mandatory arbitration clauses.  
 In addition, 36% of the 39 respondents that sell products only to other 
businesses use mandatory arbitration clauses, compared to 51% of all of the 
53 respondents that sell products to both businesses and consumers. Our 
findings suggest that companies that sell products only or primarily to other 
businesses are 15% less likely to use mandatory arbitration clauses than 
those companies that sell to both businesses and consumers. This number, 
however, is not statistically significant.65 Of course, the use of mandatory 
arbitration clauses with business customers must be viewed in light of 
business customers’ ability to negotiate changes. Most significantly, 15% of 
respondents permit changing arbitration from mandatory to optional, and 
28% of respondents permit deletion of the arbitration clause altogether. 
Therefore, while businesses may attempt to impose mandatory arbitration 
clauses upon their business customers, they are also willing to ccommodate 
 
 61. There are, of course, weaknesses inherent in any self-reporting. Because we are testing 
companies’ opinions, we are constrained by what companies report, subject to the potential for biases, 
faulty perceptions, and dishonesty inherent in all self-reports. 
 62. Eisenberg et al., supra note 1, at 883. 
 63. Id.  
 64. In response to Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s research, Professor Ware observed that: “If 
it’s a big, important contract, then you don’t put in an arbitration clause . . . . It’s entirely possible that 
businesses are being consistent in using arbitration more for immaterial contracts than for material 
contracts . . . .” Jonathan D. Glater, Companies Unlikely to Use Arbitration With Each Other, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at B4. 
 65. The resultant p-value equals 0.146. Again, we used the software SAS to calculate this 
figure. 
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those business customers who insist upon changes.66 Of course, it is simply 
impractical for companies to accommodate such requests from consumer 
customers because of the transaction costs of doing so on a mass scale. 
 Thus, our findings both support and qualify Eisenberg, Miller, and 
Sherwin’s findings in several ways. Our study supports Eisenberg, Miller, 
and Sherwin’s finding that companies are more likely to use mandatory 
arbitration clauses with individual consumers than with other businesses. 
The disparity, however, is not as stark as their study indicates. Our study 
suggests that companies are more likely to use mandatory arbitration 
clauses in standard customer contracts than in material agreements even 
when the customer is another business. They are even more likely to do so 
where the customer is a consumer rather than a business.  
C. Rationale for Inclusion of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses 
 After considering other possible explanations, Eisenberg, Miller, and 
Sherwin conclude that companies use mandatory arbitration clauses as a 
means to avoid aggregate dispute resolution, namely class action law 
suits.67 In our study, we found the primary reason for including mandatory 
arbitration clauses was to avoid litigation costs. Eight of the 15 respondents 
(53%) who did business with both companies and consumers, chose 
reduced litigation costs as the primary reason for using mandatory 
arbitration clauses. Seventeen respondents (55%) who did business solely 
with companies chose reduced litigation costs as the primary reason for 
using mandatory arbitration clauses.68  
 The respondents’ answers in our study to the question “what is the 
primary reason for the arbitration clause,” is not necessarily inconsistent 
with Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin’s conclusion. As previously noted, our 
survey was sent out prior to the publication of their study. Consequently, 
we did not tailor our questions to their findings, and did not provide the 
avoidance of aggregate dispute resolution as a possible reason for 
arbitration clauses. Those respondents who have both businesses and 
consumers as customers may have been thinking of class action law suits 
when they answered that the primary reason for the arbitration clause was to 
reduce litigation costs, as defending such suits tends to be costly. In 
addition, because our respondents dealt primarily with business customers, 
their primary concern may not have been the avoidance of aggregate 
 
 66. See supra p. 610, at tbl. 14.  
 67. Eisenberg et al., supra note 1, at 893. 
 68. Some respondents checked more than one response, which explains why total percentages 
for this question exceed 100%. 
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dispute resolution. Thus, for those businesses that deal primarily with 
consumer customers, the primary purpose for mandatory arbitration clauses 
may indeed be the avoidance of aggregate dispute resolution.  
 The frequent inclusion of mandatory arbitration clauses in business 
customer contracts, however, does suggest there are reasons other than the 
avoidance of aggregate dispute resolution for their inclusion in customer 
contracts. Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin do not specify where their subject 
companies conduct business or whether they have international customers. 
Our study suggests that for companies that conduct business internationally, 
arbitration with a familiar arbitral organization may be preferable to the 
vagaries and uncertainties of foreign law in a foreign court. For example, of 
the 20 companies that have international customers (i.e., in a country other 
than where the company is headquartered), 11 of them, or 55%, use 
mandatory arbitration clauses, which hints that the use of such clauses may 
be a norm in international transactions. In other words, if non-U.S. 
companies tend to regularly use mandatory arbitration clauses, U.S. 
companies that deal with these companies may incorporate such clauses in 
their agreements in order to conform with internationally accepted 
commercial standards.69 
 In addition, as previously noted, 73% of respondents stated that they 
had agreed to mandatory arbitration clauses in other company contracts on 
behalf of their own companies. Their willingness to do so—and that they 
were asked to do so at all—indicates that mandatory arbitration clauses are 
not confined to consumer customer contracts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The findings in our study may help companies to better understand 
attitudes about arbitration and assist in contract negotiations. Our findings, 
in conjunction with the Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin study, indicate that 
businesses are more likely to include mandatory arbitration clauses in their 
standard customer contracts than in their material-nonemployee contracts 
 
 69. Home state familiarity and convenience is a consideration even domestically. See Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler, “Unfair” Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About Nothing? in BOILERPLATE: 
FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET CONTRACTS 64 (Omni Ben-Shahar, ed., 2007). Marotta-Wurgler notes that 
arbitration clauses were “rare” in her sample of consumer contracts and that  
sellers who select arbitration invariably select the law of the state in which they 
are headquartered. The same is true for arbitration location. In fact, about 50 
percent of arbitration clauses in the EULAs of consumer-oriented products select 
California law and California venue. As is well known, California affords many 
protections to consumers in arbitration. 
 Id.  
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with other businesses. The preference for mandatory arbitration clauses in 
customer contracts  appears to be somewhat greater where the customer is a 
consumer rather than a business. Our study also suggests that the primary 
reason for mandatory arbitration clauses in customer contracts where the 
customer is a business is the avoidance of uncertainty and expenses 
associated with litigation, especially in a foreign jurisdiction. This finding 
may suggest an additional or alternative rationale to Eisenberg, Miller, and 
Sherwin’s conclusion that the primary reason for mandatory arbitration 
clauses in customer contracts with consumers is the avoidance of aggregate 
dispute resolution.  
 Finally, our study may help courts determine the materiality of 
arbitration clauses in standard form agreements between two commercial 
entities under UCC section 2-207. Our study indicates that the addition or 
deletion of arbitration clauses is material, but that certain alterations to these 
clauses, such as change of arbitration body, are not.  
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